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President Abraham Lincoln, ca. 1861. (Photograph by Matthew Brady,
neg. no. 0-60, courtesy The Lincoln Museum, Ft. Wayne, Ind.)

Lincoln's New Mexico Patronage:
Saving the Far Southwest for the Union
DEREN EARL KELLOGG

New Mexico Territory receives scant mention in connection with the
administration of President Abraham Lincoln. Historians have generally
concluded that Lincoln and other federal officials attached no great value
to the territory and mostly neglected it. It is true that Lincoln could devote
little attention to the administration of the western territories during the
Civil War, which threatened the very future of the country. However, evidence suggests that Lincoln did care about saving New Mexico:for the
Union and should be given some credit for achieving this goal. Aithough
Lincoln's western patronage record was generally undistinguished, his
appointments to the New Mexico Territory were popular men who had'
experience in the Southwest and who often did not identify themselves
with the Republican Party. In fact, the patronage record of New Mexico
was, in some ways, more.similar to those of the crucial border states of
Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland than that of the remaining western
territories.
Even among historians ofthe Southwest, there has been a conception
that the region was mostly ignored by the federal government during the
Civil War. Those who mention the attitudes of Washington officials at all
usually stress their apathy in this matter. For instance, Ray C. Colton,
writing on the war in the southwestern temtories, argues that the federal
government assigned no "strategic importance" to New Mexico until
1862. Alvin Josephy, historian of the CivilWar in the West, states that
"the western territories, and particularly New Mexico, were treated
at times as if they were a nuisance." Likewise, James A. Howard II,
Deren Earl Kellogg earned his Ph.D. in history from the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. This article is adapted from his dissertation, "The Lincoln Administration and the Southwestern Territories."
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discussing the war in New Mexico and Arizona, concludes that the government viewed New Mexico "as a burden rather than as an attribute."l
Neither Lincoln scholars nor southwestern historians have examined
Lincoln's New Mexico patronage to any great degree. J. G. Randall's
classic multivolume biography of Lincoln and recent important biographies by David Herbert Donald and Philip Shaw Paludan note New
Mexico in connection with attempts to compromise the secession crisis
in 1861, but these scholars say nothing about Lincoln's appointments to
federal offices there. In their study of Lincoln's patronage, Harry Carman
and Reinhard H. Luthin assert that Lincoln's appointment of Henry
Connelly as governor of New Mexico Territory in 1861 was the only
gubernatorial appointment "not tinged with party politics," but their work
barely touches on territorial patronage. Histories of the West and
Southwest by Ralph Y. McGinnis and Howard Roberts Lamar do give
some information on the men Lincoln appointed to New Mexico offices
but fail to fit these appointments into the broader context of territorial
patronage. Loomis Morton Ganaway's work on New Mexico's place in
the prewar slavery controversy and Vincent G. Tegeder's article on territorial patronage give Lincoln credit for appointing loyal Democrats to
office in New Mexico, but Ganaway does not discuss territorial patronage
in general, while Tegeder fails to mention Connelly.2
Territorial patronage made up a large percentage of federal patronage in the mid-nineteenth century. In each territory, a governor was
chief executive and a territorial secretary carried out many of the same
functions as state lieutenant governors. In addition, each territory was
divided into three federal judicial districts, each of which was presided
over by a federal district judge. When sitting together, these three
judges formed the territorial supreme court. Other positions included
the territorial marshalcy and land office commissioner. All positions
were filled by presidential appointment subject to confirmation by the
Senate. Each territory also had the right to send a nonvoting delegate to
the U.S. House of Representatives; these were elected by the territorial
voters. 3
.
Lincoln's policy regarding civil appointments tothe territories was
not notably different from his predecessors and successors. Partisan
political considerations played the major part in deciding who would be
appointed. Patronage was a successful presidential candidate's main
method of rewarding his supporters. In Lincoln's case, his appointments had to be acceptable to powerful eastern Republicans. At the
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beginning of Lincoln's first term, there were eight western territories:
New Mexico, Dakota, Colorado, Nebraska, Utah, Nevada, Washington,
and Indian Territory. The last of these did not have a traditional civil
government since it was administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
the branch of the Interior Department that oversaw administration of
Indian tribes. After his inauguration, then, Lincoln had the opportunity
to fill thirty-five major territorial posts, five in each territory. He
appointed residents to posts in their own territories in only nine
instances, four being in New Mexico. In the other western territories,
Lincoln appointed only five residents out of thirty total appointees and
never more than two residents in anyone territory. New Mexico was
the only territory in which residents were appointed as both governor
. and territorial secretary. The only other territory to receive a resident as
governor was Washington, but he was replaced by an Illinoisan before·
the year was out. 4
.
In the Lincoln administration, major territorial posts also tended
to go to Republicans. Many of Lincoln's appointments to territories
were associated with radical Republicans, men with very strong antislavery and politically partisan feelings. For instance, William Jayne,
appointed to the Dakota governorship, was favored by radicals
because of his strong antislavery views and his advocacy of a federally subsidized transcontinental railroad. Governor William Gilpin of
Colorado, who also supported the idea of a government-financed
transcontinental railroad, was supported by powerf\ll radical
Republican senator Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio. William H. Wallace,
Lincoln's first appointment as governor of Washington, supported
the radicals' goal of territorial organizations for Idaho and Montana.
However, some unfortunate territories were dumping grounds for
men who were clearly incompetent. For instance, Lincoln's first
appointee as governor of Utah, John W. Dawson, was a political hack
from Fort Wayne, Indiana, of such dubious character that Republican
leaders of that community had submitted his name for a territorial
office mainly to get rid of hiin. Outside New Mexico in 1861, the
only Democratic governor Lincoln appointed was James W. Nye, a
New Yorker who became Nevada's first and only territorial governor.
Despite his party affiliation, Nye was a close friend of Secretary of
State William H. Seward and a strong antislavery and pro-Union
advocate. Even chauvinistic Republican Horace Greeley, influential
editor of the New York Tribune, could approve of Nye. Lincoln's
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need to reward his supporters, Republican and Democratic, was
often the main impetus behind his choice of territorial officers. s
.Lincoln's New Mexico patronage, however, dramatically diverged
from this pattern. A prime example was Lincoln bestowing the governorship upon Dr. Henry Connelly, a Democrat. Born in Virginia in 1800
but raised in Kentucky, Connelly had been a resident of New Mexico
and Chihuahua since 1824. A prosperous and influential merchant in·
the territory when it still belonged to Mexico, Connelly had helped
arrange the surrender of New Mexico by Mexican governor Manuel
Armijo to American general Stephen W. Kearny during the war with
Mexico. In 1850 Connelly was elected governor of New Mexico during an abortive attempt to win statehood. From 1853 to 1859, he served
in the upper house of the territorial legislature and had close ties with
some of the most prominent Hispanic families of the territory. He married twice; both of his wives were Hispanas. When he was sworn in on
4 September 1861, he became the first resident to serve as territorial
governor of New Mexico under the United States. 6
Lincoln's choice for territorial secretary, the second highest territorial
office, was Miguel Antonio Otero Sr., another New Mexico resident identified with the Democrats. Born into a powerful New Mexican family,
Otero had been educated in St. Louis and New York after the territory's
transfer to the United States. In 1852-1853, Otero served in the territorial
legislature and defeated incumbent Manuel Gallegos in the 1855 election
for territorial delegate. In Washington D.C., Otero considered himself a
Democrat and supported the Kansas-Nebraska Act and Senator. Stephen
A. Douglas. He married a woman from South Carolina and became
known as a proslavery man. Otero won reelection to his post in 1857. Two
years later, he was instrumental in convincing the territorial legislature to
pass a law protecting slave property in New Mexico. He served as a delegate to the Democratic convention in Charleston in 1860, supporting
Douglas for the presidential nomination. Lincoln's victory with less than
forty percent of the popular vote drove Otero to criticize the election for
thwarting the will of the majority of the American people and bringing a
party of dangerous fanatics to power. In a manifesto "to the people ofNew
Mexico" dated 15 February 1861, Otero strongly censured the Republican
Party for its opposition to New Mexico's slave code, warning New
Mexicans of the "hostility to the death" that Republicans held toward New
Mexico and its people. He urged the election of anti-Republican legislators and delegates and predicted, "After a short duration of their power,
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Chief Justice Kirby Benedict. (Photograph by Nicholas Brown, neg. no
91330, courtesy Museum of New Mexico, Santa Fe.)

this horde of infidels will be driven from the Capital, and you, as well as
your fellow citizens of the States whose rights are menaced will be left in
peace and prosperity." However, Otero did not openly advocate the secession of the territory, instructing New Mexicans that "the faculties with
which the law has clothed the Legislative Assembly are sufficiently ample
for your protection." Likewise, he believed that Lincoln's antislavery tendencies would be moderated through Congress and that the election
results were not sufficient cause to destroy the Union. However, western newspapers reported that Otero allegedly favored joining California
and Oregon should they secede to form a "Pacific Republic."7
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Gov. Henry Connelly. (Portrait from Calvin Hom, New Mexico s Troubled
Years: The Story of the Early Territorial Governors (Albuquerque, N.Mex.:
Hom and Wallace, 1963),92.)

Lincoln retained Kirby Benedict, another Democrat, as chief justice
of the territorial supreme court. Benedict was one ofthe few New Mexico
officers whom the president knew personally. Although born in
Connecticut, Benedict had been an attorney in Illinois two decades earlier and knew Douglas as well as Lincoln. Since becoming a judge in New
Mexico in 1853, Benedict had gained a reputation as a political supporter of Douglas and had been appointed chief justice of New Mexico by
President James Buchanan in 1858. Despite Benedict's Democratic affiliation, Lincoln had faith in his Unionism and knowledge of the law, and
refused to remove him, even when radical Republicans protested. 8
For the other two supreme court justices in New Mexico, Lincoln
chose Sydney A. Hubbell and Joseph G. Knapp. Hubbell, a resident of
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Bernalillo County, New Mexico, had served on the Territorial Council,
in the upper house of the legislature, during the 1860-1861 session.
Although not a public figure as well-known as Connelly or Otero, he
was respected in the territory's legal community. A correspondent of the
New York Times reported that the new justice enjoyed "the full confidence of the bar and the public in devotion to his country's service."
The correspondent also praised Hubbell's "just discrimination and good
sense." Knapp, a resident of Wisconsin, was recommended to Lincoln
by Senator James R. Doolittle, a Republican of that state, and other
members of Wisconsin's congressional delegation. Knapp's appointment received little notice at the time, but he would later become the
center of one ofNew Mexico's most acrimonious public debates when he
criticized the policies of Brig. Gen. James H. Carleton, the commander
of the Department of New Mexico. 9
In appointing Connelly and Otero to office in New Mexico, Lincoln
faced substantial opposition within his own party. Several Republicans in
both New Mexico and the states were wary of Connelly. William Need,
a soldier in the territory, wrote Secretary of State Seward to protest
Connelly's nomination. According to Need, the nominee had- been a
friend of slavery-technically legal in New Mexico--and had himself
been a slaveholder. Only changing his allegiance in response to circumstances, Connelly was "now a professed neutral Union man, provided the
Union cause is strongest." A correspondent for the New York Tribune
made similar charges in October 1861. He alleged that Connelly was "at
heart a secessionist," had been a prime advocate of New Mexico's slave
code, and had aided secessionists in the territory. Instead of offering evidence, the correspondent claimed that these charges could "be proved if
necessary." In point of fact, the allegations of both Need and the
Tribune's correspondent contained some truth. Connelly was indeed a
former slaveholder and, as a member of the 1859 territorial legislature,
had voted in favor of the territorial slave code. lo
Like many Democratic Unionists, Connelly did not actively oppose
the institution of slavery at the war's beginning but neither did he ever
make any public statements or take any action in support of secession.
Most Republicans came to accept Connelly as his commitment to the
Union became apparent. On Christmas Day, the Tribune published, without editorial comment, a portion of Connelly's 1861 annual message, in
which the governor lauded New Mexicans' efforts on behalf of the Union
and promised to continue the fight against the Confederacy. The same
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Miguel A. Otero Sr., ca. 1881. (Photograph, neg. no. 152218, courtesy
Museum of New Mexico, Santa Fe.)

column and one published three days later also mentioned that Connelly
favored the repeal of the territorial slave code. The New YorkTimes, more
moderate than the Tribune yet still a pro-Lincoln paper, printed an
excerpt from Connelly's inaugural address, calling it "an able and patriotic document." A correspondent of the Ohio State Journal complimented Connelly on the antisecessionist tone, labelling his annual message
"most excellent." These impressions of Connelly were strengthened
when the New Mexico slave code was repealed in December and he
continued to speak out on the need for New Mexicans to support the
Union's war effort. ll
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Otero's nomination was not at all popular among Republicans, due
to his strong identification with the proslavery South and his open
excoriation of the Republican Party. The same William Need who had
warned Seward against Connelly also charged Otero with being lukewarm in his support of the Union. Need wrote, "I think he is a neutral
Union man, and can ~jump on either side of the fence.'" Greeley went a
step farther, bluntly calling Otero a "traitor." When Otero's nomination
was just a rumor, Greeley reminded New York Tribune readers of his role
in formulating a slave code for the territory and implied that Otero's
appointment to a territorial office would jeopardize New Mexico for the
Union. Greeley concluded, "There has been no more pliant tool of the
Slavery Extensionists than this same Otero." The Tribune printed Otero's
February manifesto without comment in November 1861 under the headline, "Secession in New Mexico." Although Otero did not explicitly call
for New Mexico to join the Confederacy, this document was generally
considered secessionist in tone by Republican sympathizers. "Luz," a
New York Tribune correspondent in New Mexico, claimed that Otero had
sent the manifesto to wealthy Hispanos, "urging on them strongly the
claims of the Southern Confederacy to their support." So pervasive was
this interpretation of the manifesto that it was passed on to historians.
Benson J. Lossing's Pictorial History ofthe Civil War, a popular history
that went through several editions in the late nineteenth century, stated
that the purpose of the manifesto was "to incite the inhabitants Of New
Mexico to rebellion." In 1889 the well-known historian of the West,
Hubert Howe Bancroft cited Lossing's statement, although Bancroft did
not study the address himself. As late as the 1920s, New Mexico historian Ralph Emerson Twitchell accused Otero of being "disloyal to the
core," mainly on the basis of the manifesto. Twitchell's assessment
apparently agreed with that of Otero's Republican contemporaries, for in
July Otero's nomination was decisively defeated in the United States
Senate. The three-term delegate very quickly faded from the New
Mexico political scene; he had already decided to pursue mercantile
interests in Missouri. He had delayed his departure only to serve as territorial secretary. With nothing further to hold him in New Mexico,
Otero moved to Missouri in 1862. 12
Why did Lincoln break with his usual territorial policy so dramatically in making appointments to New Mexico? New Mexico was a
unique territory at the outset of the Civil War. It was still relatively new,
most of its geographical area only becoming part of the United States
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in 1848 as a result of American victory in the war with Mexico. The
area bounded by the Rio Grande on the east, the Colorado River on the
west, the Gila River on the north, and the Mexican border on the south
was an even more recent acquisition officially purchased from Mexico
in 1854. Commonly called the Gadsden Purchase, this parcel of land
was known popularly as "Arizona," although it was part of New
Mexico Territory and not a separate political entity. Alone among western territories, New Mexico had a non-Indian population made up
mostly of Hispanos, former citizens of Mexico who retained their own
culture and Spanish language under American jurisdiction. The census
of 1850 counted fewer than six hundred English-speaking whites, or
Anglos, out of a total non-Indian population of nearly fifty-seven thousand people in New Mexico. 13
Lincoln had to make patronage decisions against a backdrop of
public pessimism in the North over New Mexico's loyalty. It was widely
believed in the loyal states that New Mexico was in great danger of
becoming a part of the Confederacy. Greeley asserted that New Mexico's
leading men and officeholders were all southern sympathizers and that
"the masses are their blind, facile tools." In February 1861, Greeley
declared that "the secession rebellion is in full blast" in southern New
Mexico. The New York Tribune reported that pro-Confederate leaders
were mounting an effort to take New Mexico into the Confederacy. "With
the help of Texas and of Gen. Twiggs [they] may perhaps hope to succeed," Greeley concluded. 14
Their apprehension had some foundation; a number of factors tied
New Mexico to the South. The 1859 slave code had been passed to create alliance with southern legislators to help New Mexico win a
transcontinental railroad route. In addition, many men who held important federal positions in the territory had been appointed by Democratic
administrations and were of southern origins or had expressed sympathy
for the slave states. Colonel William W. Loring, who became the commander of the Military Department of New Mexico in March 1861, was
a North Carolinian, as was Governor Abraham Rencher, Connelly's
predecessor. Rencher, called by Greeley's New York Tribune "a useful
tool of the Slave Power," was the latest in a line of southern men to hold
the top executive office in the territory; all three of his predecessors as
civil governor had been residents of slave states at the time they were
appointed to office. Territorial Secretary Alexander M. Jackson, whom
Otero was to replace, had been born in Ireland, but was raised in
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Mississippi and openly supported the Confederacy. Many of the men
who owned' mines in the southern and southwestern parts of the territory, such as Granville Oury and Sylvester Mowry, were sympathetic to
the South. Otero himself, who was finishing his third term as territorial
delegate in 1861, openly declared his alliance with southern legislators
in Washington. Greeley concluded that "zealous Slavery Propagandists
fill all the important Federal offices" in New Mexico. On 2 April, echoing Greeley, the St. Louis Republican published an anonymous letter
charging Governor Rencher with leading a prosouthern "revolution" in
Santa Fe and capturing nearby Fort Marcy. IS
The rumor lacked even a shred of truth, but the Tribune and
Republican articles typified Union public attitudes toward New Mexico.
In addition, the president of the Confederate States ofAmerica, Jefferson
Davis, was known to have a marked interest in the Far Southwest. As
President Franklin Pierce's secretary of war, Davis had ordered the
exploration and survey of the region and urged the Gadsden Purchase
to pave the way for a transcontinental railroad through the region, a
route that would have benefitted the slave states. There was some suspicion that he had deliberately stocked the territory with military officers whom he knew to be secessionists. From New Mexico, Need wrote
to Secretary of War Simon Cameron that Davis's "military prototypes
and proteges ... were placed here purposely to second and forward his
ulterior designs." The New York Tribune charged, "Pro-Slavery Army
officers have been sent there, taking slaves with them."16
It was not unusual for easterners to question the devotion of western residents to the Union in 1861, but in New Mexico hard evidence
demonstrated that disloyalty was a serious problem. Although rumors
of pro-Confederate activity in the Santa Fe area were false, resentment
against the North was strong in the Gadsden Purchase area known as
Arizona-although this resentment was directed as' much against the
territorial government as against Washington. Because this area was so
far distant from the territorial capital and could only be reached through
land occupied by hostile tribes, the territorial government never established regular courts or law enforcement there. Disgusted with this state
of affairs, Arizonans had been agItating since 1856 to have the region
declared a separate federal territory. In 1860 a public convention met at
Mesilla, a town on the Rio Grande in southern New Mexico and founded the Territory of Arizona. On 16 March 1861 its leaders declared
Arizona's attachment to the Confederacy. Later that spring, another
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convention in Arizona's other population center, Tucson, seconded this
initiative. Aiding this process were Arizona's commercial ties to Texas
and the Texans themselves, who sent representatives to encourage the
Arizona secessionist movement.!?
Another danger was that New Mexico was the only western territory, excepting Indian Territory, to border on a rebellious state. Texans
had long dreamed of acquiring an outlet to the Pacific, and the
Confederacy was aiming at an alliance with, or a military takeover of,
the northern Mexican states, which would endanger New Mexico. New
Mexico stood on the route of any invasion that the South might launch
against mineral-rich California as well.!S
Lincoln, then, was aware that the Far Southwest was highly vulnerable to Confederate and pro-Confederate influence. Appointing
officials sent from eastern states, he surmised, would only cause local
resentment that might very well tip the balance of popular feeling
against Washington and toward the secessionists. Yet, if Lincoln desired
to appoint residents to federal New Mexico posts, he would have to do so
at the expense of strengthening the Republican Party in the territory.
Because New Mexico had been Mexican territory until 1848, traditional
American party organizations were of little importance in the territory.
Throughout the l850s, the vast majority of legislators in New Mexico
were of Mexican origin, and few had ever been exposed to or had a
chance to take part in the American party system. Parties in New Mexico
tended to be semiformal groupings based on specific regional issues. The
first political factions under U.S. governance had formed around 1851
over the issue of whether Hispanos or Anglos should hold key territorial
offices. Later, attempts to reform the Roman Catholic Church in the
territory provided another issue that fractured the existing factions.
Although prominent New Mexicans occasionally identified themselves
with national parties, loyalties to family and to local and regional factions
were ofmuch more importance and overshadowed national political allegiances. Given that Democratic administrations had been in power for all
but the first two years of New Mexico's tenure as a territory, most of the
experienced New Mexico politicians from the states were Democratic
officeholders. Although a few individuals in New Mexico claimed allegiance to the Republican Party, there was no effective party organization
from which Lincoln could draw appointrnents.!9
Under these conditions, Lincoln proved willing to give serious
weight to patronage recommendations from residents of the area. His
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main correspondent from New Mexico was John S. Watts, a former federaljustice in the territory. Watts came from the same Whig-Republican
background as the president. A lawyer in Indiana in the 1840s, he had
served as a Whig in Indiana's House of Representatives from 1846 to
1847 and had been appointed an associate justice in New Mexico by
Whig president Millard Fillmore in 1851. After resigning in 1854,
Watts stayed on to practice law. By 1861, he was known as one of the
territory's leading Unionists. In several letters to both Lincoln and
Seward, Watts emphasized that placing nonresidents in New Mexico's
territorial offices would have serious consequences. "If you or your
cabinet are of the opinion that you have not friends enough in New
Mexico to fill the little worthless places to be filled in it," Watts
informed the president, "so long as that opinion is entertained and acted
upon you will never have votes enough to win an election in it."20·
Watts recommended both Connelly and Otero for their territorial
posts. He called the former "the most able influential and popular man
in New Mexico." Watts's recommendation for Otero was even more
emphatically stated: "Upon the appointment of Mr. Otero to this office
depends the success or failure of the administration in New Mexico."
Dr. Michael Steck, a longtime resident of the territory who would.
become its superintendent of Indian affairs the following year, concurred with Watts. Both men daimedthat Otero would, in Steck's
words, "favour the views of the present administration," a surprising
statement in view of Otero's clearly stated antipathy to Republicanism.
However, the two men believed that Otero could help solidify the
ostensibly doubtful Unionism of New Mexico's Hispanos, who were,
after all, the dominant population of citizens in the territory, at least in
a numerical sense. "Had the question of disunion not presented itself I
should not have recommended the appointment of Mr. Otero," Watts
informed Lincoln, "but the issue now is with New Mexico, Texas and
slavery or the United States and freedom and in that battle I shall find
Mr. Otero and the large mass of his people on the side of the Union and
freedom." Watts believed that having Otero as secretary would "preserve the Territory from internal discontent." He explained to Lincoln,
"If [Otero] is appointed the large majority of the contending parties are
united and success is easy. If he is not appointed he will be run for
Delegate and party issues will be deepened and intensified." Steck succinctly summed up the point: "[Otero] is a native of this territory and
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connected with the most wealthy and influential families in the Country
and enjoys the entire confidence of his people."21
President Lincoln put a great deal of stock in Watts's judgement. His
western origins, his Whig political background, his well-known
Unionism, and his appointment to federal office by the Fillmore administration for which Lincoln vigorously campaigned, may well have made
the president favorably inclined toward the frontier lawyer. In addition,
by providing a detailed list of recommendations, Watts relieved Lincoln
of the tedious task of finding for himself men fit to govern a distant territory about which Lincoln had little firsthand knowledge. Still, Lincoln's
decision to be guided by Watts shows a good deal of consideration
toward New Mexico. Acting on Watts's recommendation, Lincoln both
defied elements of his own party and broke with his usual policy for
appointing territorial officials. 22
Congress's refusal to confirm Otero's appointment left Lincoln with
the problem of finding a replacement. His choice, James H. Holmes, was
a more typical Lincoln territorial appointee than Otero. A Republican and
native of New York, Holmes had been nominated for office by two powerful Republican senators, James H. Lane of Kansas and Charles Sumner
of Massachusetts. On the other hand, Holmes had lived in New Mexico
for three years before his appointment; so he presumably had some familiarity with the territory before taking the job. Holmes proved to be an
unfortunate choice for Lincoln. The new secretary was widely unpopular
in the territory and provoked a battle between a coalition of moderate
Republicans and Democrats, led by Watts (now territorial delegate), and
more radical Republicans. In February 1862, Watts charged Holmes with
leaving New Mexico without State Department permission at a time when
the territory was under threat of conquest by Texas. According to Watts,
Holmes had gone to Washington "to slander the Governor, the
Superintendent ofIndianAffairs, myself, and other friends of your admin- .
istration because we are not rabid abolitionists." Watts also preferred
against Holmes a long list of formal charges encompassing both personal
misconduct and official corruption. The former included allegations that
Holmes had owned a brothel and a "Whiskey Shop" near Fort Union,
New Mexico. The latter encompassed accusations that the secretary had
given to relatives and acquaintances drafts from public funds and secured
an appointment as New Mexico's U.S. marshal for his brother-in-law,
who was neither qualified for the post nor a resident of the territory. Watts
even went so far as to state that Holmes was "utterly condemned &
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despised as unworthy of the association of gentlemen by all the Federal
Officers in N. Mexico." In addition, Holmes attempted to found a newspaper in Santa Fe, which appeared to be a conflict of interest to many
New Mexicans, given that the territorial secretary awarded government
printing contracts. 23
Holmes's supporters charged that the campaign against him was part
of an overall effort to discredit Republicans in the territory and open it to
domination by men whose loyalty to the Union was dangerously unreliable. Watts's remark about abolitionism was almost certainly a response to
attempts by Holmes to bring the issue of the repealed 1859 slave code into
the battle. Writing in defense of Holmes was Eliakim Persons Walton, a
Republican congressman from Vermont. Walton was also a personal
friend of S. B. Watrous, a leading Republican in New Mexico. The
Vermont politician stated of Governor Connelly, Superintendent James L.
Collins, Chief Justice Benedict, and their supporters, "I know some of
them as the. tools of Reuben Davis of Mississippi in foisting the notorious
and abominable pro-slavery act upon an unwilling people, and some of
them as sympathizers with rebels." Augustus Wattles, an Indian agent in
the territory, charged that the opposition to Holmes was a politically motivated response to his efforts to build "a Republican press and Republican
Party in New Mexico," and thus to resist the passage of New Mexico into
Democratic and, implicitly, disloyal ranks. Senator Sumner reminded
Lincoln that Holmes had founded "a Republican paper" in Santa Fe, and'
Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas warned Lincoln that removing
Holmes "would.be disastrous to the best interests" of New Mexico. 24
Lincoln's previous appointments, especially those of Connelly and
Otero, had been opposed by the radical Republicans both in Congress
and New Mexico, but Holmes's appointment prefigured the greater success radicals would have in influencing New Mexican affairs after the
Union repulse of the Confederate invasion in 1862. It soon became
clear, however, that Watts's influence with the administration had not
ended, for by January 1862 Lincoln and Seward had already decided to
remove Holmes. An anonymous note on the State Department's copy of
the charges against Holmes hints at the trust Watts still inspired in
Washington: "Mr. Watts bases his application for the removal of Mr.
Holmes upon facts communicated to him from sources known to be
true." A striking sign of Lincoln's concern for public opinion within the
territory was that he held it above the wishes of such influential
Republicans as Sumner and Pomeroy.25
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To evaluate the role that New Mexico's distinctive situation may
have played in Lincoln's appointments, it is useful to examine briefly
his patronage record in New Mexico's neighbor to the north.
Colorado Territory shared some characteristics with New Mexico.
Although not contiguous to any seceded state, fewer than fifty miles
lay between Colorado's southeastern comer and the nearest point in
Texas, across the panhandle of Indian Territory. Also, rumors of proConfederate initiatives in Colorado were rife in the early days of the
conflict. A few secessionists in the territory made no secret of their
sympathies, causing Unionists to fear widespread anti-Unionist conspiracies~ Shortly after taking office in May 1861, Governor William
Gilpin warned Colonel Edward R. S. Canby, the commander of the
Department of New Mexico in Santa Fe, of "the strong and malignant
element within this Territory," whose object was a· takeover of
Colorado as a prelude to a Confederate invasion of New Mexico.
Rumors of secessionist sentiment in Colorado had already reached
Lincoln's ears in Washington by the spring of 1861. He had given
face-to-face instructions to Gilpin that the latter's mission as governor would be to keep Colorado from falling into the hands of the
secessionists. 26
Lincoln appointed territorial officials to Colorado with much the same
discernment that was evident in the New Mexican appointments. For
example Gilpin, although a resident of Missouri, was an acknowledged
expert on Colorado. While serving in Colonel Alexander Doniphan's
command during the Mexican War, Gilpin had traveled extensively in
the area. In 1860, he authored a book praising Colorado's mineral
potential, even going so far as to predict that the territory would one
day become the center of world civilization. So Closely was Gilpin
identified with Colorado that a Lincoln-authored memorandum on territorial appointments identified him as being "of Colorado" although he
lived in Missouri. Gilpin's appointment was a popular one in the territory. The territorial secretary, Lewis L. Weld, was also very familiar
with Colorado, working as an attorney in Colonido for several years,
and practicing law for a time in Denver and then in the gold-mining
region of Gregory. Thus, the two most important federal officials in
Colorado were men who were knowledgeable about the region and
familiar to residents of the territory. Only one other Coloradan was
appointed to a federal post-Denver businessman Copeland Townsend
as U.S. marshal. The remainder of territorial offices went to outsiders,
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but Lincoln's slate of appointments generally met with widespread
approval in the territory. His patronage in Colorado reflected his policy
in New Mexico: appointing well-known figures with creditable qualifications to the most important offices. Also as in New Mexico, Lincoln's
appointment took strongly into account the perception. that Colorado
was vulnerable to Confederate attack.27
The experience of New Mexico in federal patronage resembled that
of the border slave states more than that of other western territories. In
the crucial states of Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware-slave
states that did not secede-Lincoln also concentrated on appointing
strong Unionists regardless of party. Although the president could not
appoint high executive officials to the states, he did control important
federal offices such as United States postmasters, district attorneys, and
marshals and, of course, appointments to the highest level of the military.
For instance, Kentucky's United States district attorney, James Harlan,
was a Unionist Whig, as were many' of the appointments to federal offices
in that state. Lincoln split his Maryland patronage almost equally
between the followers of his Republican postmaster general,
Montgomery Blair, and the faction loyal to powerful congressman Henry
Winter Davis, a political gadfly who had supported the Constitutional
Union Party in the 1860 presidential election. In Missouri, Lincoln
allowed himself to be guided in patronage matters by Francis P. Blair Jr.,
brother of the postmaster general. The Blair~ were Republicans, but moderate ones; family patriarch Francis P. Blair Sr. was a slaveholder and the
family enjoyed credibility among Democrats. Their dedication to the
.Union cause was not in question in the Lincoln administration, but his
commitment to the Blairs angered many radical Republicans. Lincoln
also removed General John C. Fremont, a hero to many radicals, from
command in Missouri after the general issued an unpopular proclamation freeing the slaves of Confederate sympathizers. 28
New Mexico fits into this pattern quite neatly, although in some
ways Lincoln went farther in the territory to appease non-Republicans
than he did in the border states. Many non-Republicans he appointed to
office in the states were Constitutional Unionists or Whigs, but most
New Mexico appointments went to Democrats, and few appointees in
border states had the kind of prosouthern history that Otero could claim.
Of course, far less was at stake in New Mexico than in Missouri,
Kentucky, or Maryland. The secession of Maryland would have left the
national .capital entirely surrounded by Confederate territory, and
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Lincoln was convinced that the loss of Kentucky would make the entire
Union military position untenable. It is likely that Lincoln carefully
struck a balance between Unionism and local acceptance even more in
the border states than in New Mexico. Still, the similarity of Lincoln's
patronage policy in New Mexico to that in the border states suggests the
territory's strategic importance in Lincoln's thinking. 29
Although not an economically critical territory in 1861, Lincoln considered New Mexico important enough to abandon partisan considerations in his initial appointments in order to ensure that the territory stayed
loyal to Washington. Confederate troops from Texas invaded New
Mexico and captured Mesilla late in the summer of 1861. After a winter
break, Confederate general Henry Hopkins Sibley, who had served in the
U.S. Army in New Mexico, resumed the offensive in February 1862.
Although Sibley hoped to win converts from New Mexico to his cause,
he received almost no support north of secessionist Arizona. Two complete New Mexico volunteer regiments were raised from the Hispanic
population to fight the invaders. Many Hispanos were motivated by a
profound hatred of Texans harking back to Texan filibustering expeditions against New Mexico in the 1840s and the Texas-New Mexico
boundary dispute at the end of the Mexican-American War. However,
Lincoln's appointees certainly helped the cause of Unionism in the territory. Governor Connelly in particular was instrumental in rallying New
Mexicans to resist the Confederate invasion, mostly by appealing to their
enmity toward Texans. The Texans were initially successful, even managing to capture Santa Fe. However, by July 1862 they were pushed out
of the territory by the New Mexicans augmented by troops from
Colorado and Califomia. 30
Once the Confederate threat was removed, Lincoln's appointment
policy in New Mexico became more typical of his territorial patronage
as a whole. After this point, Lincoln's appointments seemed motivated
by partisan politics to a greater degree. The discredited Secretary
Holmes was replaced by William F. M. Amy, who had formerly resided
in Illinois, where he was an acquaintance of Lincoln, and in Kansas. He
had lived in New Mexico for only a year after being appointed the
Indian agent for the Ute and Jicarilla Apache agency in the northern part
of the territory. A well-known radical Republican, Amy heightened
political tension in the territory by attempting to counteract the influence
of the earlier Democratic appointees such as Connelly. The governor and
Justice Benedict were allowed to maintain their posts fOf the rest of
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Lincoln's life, but many lesser offices went to men of powerful
Republican connections. For instance, Nathaniel Usher, brother of
Secretary of the Interior John Palmer Usher, was appointed a Federal
district justice in New Mexico in 1864. This later switch in policy helped
demonstrate that during the early crisis months Lincoln was less concerned with creating political allies among the Republicans-radicals
particularly-than with trying to ensure the loyalty of New Mexico's
residents. The appointments of Connelly and Otero to federal office
alienated some Republicans but won the Lincoln administration friends
in New Mexico. Once that crisis was over, patronage in New Mexico
became motivated more by political partisanship especially as Lincoln
looked toward reelection in fall 1864. 31
It would certainly be difficult to argue against the prevailing notion
that the federal government assigned relatively little importance to New
Mexico in 1861. And yet, perhaps Lincoln should be given more credit
for foresight on the issue than he has been. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, territorial patronage was granted for partisan considerations and Lincoln's appointments were, on the whole, no exception to
this rule. His early appointments to New Mexico Territory's offices,
however, did constitute an exception. New Mexico's unique position as
a territory with a non-Anglo majority among U.S. citizens, proximity to
a seceded state, and a strong secessionist movement made enough of an
impression to justify Lincoln abandoning his usual territorial policy and
defying his own party to ensure that the territory stayed loyal to the
Union. His New Mexico patronage policy did bear some similarities to
his policies in the border states, where he sought to build broad crossparty coalitions that would help ensure their citizens' loyalty. Although
Lincoln's record as a territorial administrator was generally unexceptional, New Mexico's experience proved that he could be flexible and
inspired when the situation demanded.
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